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Abstract  
The literature on employers’ and business organisations (EOs) has failed to analyse them as 
contentious organisations that apply identity-work as a power resource to mobilise resources 
and members. This article is based on a qualitative case study of Islamic EOs in Turkey. 
Developing a social movement model of EOs, I analyse the mechanisms through which 
identity-work with local religious collaborators facilitated collective action and political 
power. I find that the role of identity-work was three-fold: providing internal solidarity, 
securing external legitimacy, and supporting contentious institutional change by developing 
new policy ideas. This model can be applied more widely as EOs have increasingly shifted 
from traditional roles to take on social movement characteristics.  
 




In market economies with an institutionalised role for labour, a traditional process in the 
collective action of employers is negotiating with trade unions. However, as institutional 
support for collective bargaining has declined, employers’ organisations (EO) have had to 
adapt and actively mobilise new members and resources to survive. Which tactics they use 
and how these lead to continued influence are important questions. The employment relations 
(ER) and HRM literatures either treat EOs as rational and functional organisations, or focus 
on how structural-institutional variables influence their success in mobilising and gaining 
political power. Studies in the corporatist tradition argue that strong organisational structures 
facilitate both EOs’ policy support for strategic national political elites by efficiently 
controlling members, and member mobilisation by efficient interest aggregation (Behrens & 
Helfen, 2009; Schmitter & Streeck, 1999). More recent studies analyse EOs’ new mix of 
activities and resources outside of collective bargaining, which appeal to employers’ rational 
material and lobbying interests (Behrens & Traxler, 2004; Hornung-Draus, 2002; Sheldon, 
Nacamulli, Paoletti, & Morgan, 2016). Few studies examine an important tactic in 
employers’ mobilisation toolkit– identity-work. Identity-work refers to the processes through 
which individuals or collectivities give meaning to themselves or to others (Schwalbe & 
Mason-Schrock, 1996, p. 115). Yet, it is through identity-work that employers make sense of 
their environment, and bind members together (Snow, 2004) around shared identities, values 
and goals (Snow & Benford, 1988) to provide the crucial legitimacy for their policy influence 
and rational material interests. This ‘inadequacy’ in the literature (Locke & Golden-Biddle, 
1997) can be addressed by applying concepts from social movement theory to the study of 
EOs. Identity-work plays a key role in theories of social movement mobilisation (Cress & 
Snow, 2000, p. 1071).  
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Identity-work is increasingly relevant as new social movements in employment 
relations mobilising around collective identities like religion, gender or ethnicity have 
proliferated (Piore & Safford, 2006). In the UK, for example, new issue-specific employer 
forums collaborate with or were founded by identity-based movements and civil society 
organisations (Gooberman, Hauptmeier, & Heery, 2017; Heery, Abbott, & Williams, 2012). 
Business politics has experienced a religious revival in Latin American (Schneider 2004) as 
well as majority-Muslim countries like Indonesia (Hefner, 2011), and across the Middle East 
(Gerges, 2013).  
In this article, I apply concepts from social movement theory to explain how identity-
work can complement EOs’ rational activities and lead to mobilisation and political power. It 
relies on a case study of the then two most influential Islamic EOs in Turkey, Müsiad 
(Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association) and Tuskon (Turkey 
Industrialists’ Confederation) from 1993 until 2013. The competition among EOs in Turkey 
has been part of a political struggle between broad Islamic and secular alliances. These 
Islamic EOs, with the support of the international Islamic movement, the Gülen community, 
played a crucial role in the gradual displacement of the traditional Kemalisti political and 
economic elites (Turam, 2007), and the empowerment of the Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) (Hale & Özbudun, 2009). The Islamic coalition had been collaborating, applying 
identity-based social movement tactics from the early 1990s, when the first Islamic EO had 
been formed, until 2013, when the AKP began to resort to top-down control, and internal 
conflicts led to purges and even to Tuskon’s closure. These tensions culminated in the 
attempted July 2016 coup, the consequences of which are beyond the focus of this study.  
Islamic EOs developed shared collective identities and different types of ideas that 
they drew on in their collective action frames (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986). 
These ideas included a new value system and policy framework as well as beliefs about 
Page 3 of 35 Human Resource Management Journal
 4
effective strategies to attain collective action goals. Goldstein and Keohane (1993, p. 9ff.) 
called these principled beliefs, foreground ideas and causal beliefs, respectively.  
Established interest groups like EOs are traditionally differentiated from social 
movements; however this paper argues that EOs can be conceptualised as such if they engage 
in indirect contention. Typically, the concept of social movement is applied if there is some 
informal and disruptive type of protest directed at economic or political authority, such as 
Turkey’s 2013 Gezi Park or the Arab Spring demonstrations. Organisational or purely 
market-based tactics, such as providing selective goods through lobbying or recruiting 
members do not qualify as disruptive; neither do ‘contained’ tactics such as creating new 
identities or values through identity-work. However, this article argues that this 
conceptualisation needs to be more nuanced since challenges to authority need not be direct 
or feature open protest to be effective. Islamic EOs aimed to disrupt Kemalist institutions 
through tactics that were indirectly contentious and were located outside of traditional 
employer collective action channels. Islamic EOs’ framing of policy ideas and grievances, 
the development of shared identities, values, goals, and norms created a shared understanding 
and trust among diverse employers. Most importantly, Islamic EOs’ identity-work was 
contentious and challenged authority, qualifying it as a social movement tactic and a power 
resource, since it fulfilled an important function in the process of institutional changeii: 
Introducing Islamic ideas into public debate and then normalising suppressed Islamic codes 
of behaviour, values, and norms and identities were essential first steps before resource-rich 
EOs could effect wider institutional change in the regulative context. Selective goods that 
fulfilled rational material interests of employers served wider public goals and were effective 
only because of Islamic EOs’ framing. The frames employed by Islamic EOs were essential 
to give justification and legitimacy to the public and selective goods that they created.  
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Employers’ organisations as social movements 
The corporatist literature emerged to conceptualise tripartite concertation agreements 
(Baccaro, 2003; Lehmbruch, 1984; Streeck, 2006). These approaches focus on structural-
institutional variables, namely the cooperation in national-level policymaking between 
organised interest groups and governments, as well as on the organisational structures that 
enabled such cooperation. The aggregation of business interests and the provision of market 
information through peak EOs to strategic national politicians was a key motivator of the 
European corporatism of the 1970s. In this stream of literature, centralised, encompassing, 
and hierarchical organisational capacities are regarded as essential power resources for 
efficient mobilisation and political influence (Behrens & Helfen, 2009; Schmitter & Streeck, 
1999).  
More recent studies analyse how EOs across Europe have adapted as collective 
bargaining and trade union power as institutional push-factors for employer collective action 
have declined. EOs in Germany and Denmark have been shown to depend more strongly on 
grassroots members’ interests (Behrens, 2011; Hornung-Draus, 2002), and EOs in Italy and 
Australia have been shown to increasingly prioritise commercial over associational objectives 
(Sheldon et al., 2016). Likewise, EOs in Europe were found to increasingly focus on services, 
political lobbying and HR (Behrens & Traxler, 2004; Hornung-Draus, 2002). In short, EOs 
increasingly provide selective incentives for members’ rational material interests. Rational 
actors in large, heterogeneous groups such as the mixed EOs of this study, which represent 
the interests of their members in both labour and product markets, face strong incentives for 
free-riding that make cooperation difficult (Olson, 1971). We would therefore expect strong 
selective incentives, in addition to public goods, to support EO mobilisation. 
Social movement theory can provide a fruitful extension to better explain the variety 
and effectiveness of EO mobilisation strategies to the existing literature that either 
Page 5 of 35 Human Resource Management Journal
 6
conceptualises EOs as functional economic organisations or focuses on structural-
institutional variables. The causal models found within social movement theory include a 
range of tactics and actors. Social movements are defined as ‘collectivities acting with some 
degree of organization and continuity outside of institutional or organizational channels for 
the purpose of challenging or defending existing authority, whether it is institutionally or 
culturally based, in the group, organization, society, culture, or world order of which they are 
a part’ (Snow, Soule, & Kriesi, 2004, p. 11). Social movement theory, although developed 
initially to explain mass protests in the 1960s as well as labour- and community-oriented 
movements in the West, has been widely applied to study Islamic mass movements at large 
(e.g. Burke III & Lapidus, 1988; Singerman, 2004; Yavuz, 2003). This article argues that 
EOs can be conceptualised as social movements if they fulfil the three key characteristics 
contained in the above definition: firstly, EOs need to go beyond an internal membership 
focus on selective goods and aim to challenge employment relations norms or institutions. In 
order to fulfil this criterion, the activities of EOs need to include activities that can be 
categorised as public goods. In Turkey, mobilisation occurred outside of established channels 
of business politics to include informal networks with civil society rather than formalised 
channels with power-holders, thus fulfilling a second criterion of social movement 
categorisation. Most importantly, this article argues that EOs can fit the definition of social 
movements provided that the latter is not limited to explicit and direct forms of contention, to 
include, what I call, ‘indirect contention’. 
Protest can occur in many forms, and the social movement categorisation should 
include any means, as long as the ultimate goal and effect is explicit contention. Established 
interest groups like EOs are traditionally not conceptualised as social movements since they 
are legitimate political actors that use contained, institutionalised mobilisation tactics or focus 
exclusively on selective goods rather than explicit contention through direct disruption and 
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violence (Tarrow, 1998). Neither ‘symbolic and peaceful forms of disruption’ based on 
collaboration (Tarrow 2011, p. 102), including identity-work and challenging culture through 
religious practices, nor contained organisational practices, such as providing selective 
incentives, lobbying, collective bargaining or tripartite negotiations are generally classed as 
contentious. However, this article argues that EOs can be classed as social movements even if 
they do not engage in protest that can be conceptualised as directly violent or disruptive, but 
that ultimately aims at challenging authority and at explicit contention. This is in line more 
recent social movement literature suggests that movement mobilisation tactics range from 
contentious to non-contentious, and from attacking state or cultural authority through 
collaboration and/or confrontation (Bakker, Hond, King, & Weber, 2013). The mixed EOs in 
Turkey are ‘non-traditional’ movements insofar as they did not directly attack the state, but 
rather applied non-contentious tactics in the market and civic spheres, providing selective and 
public goods as well through identity-work in collaboration with religious civil society. 
Students of Islamic movements confirm that the Turkish case provides a curious combination 
of ideological and rational resources, and of contentious and non-contentious tactics (Tuğal, 
2009; Turam, 2007; Yavuz, 2003), which ultimately, if not directly, aimed at long-term 
transformation of the state. 
Framing is a mechanism in the struggle over ideas with the purpose of inspiring and 
legitimating the activities of social organisations. Snow and Benford (1988, p. 198) called 
framing the ‘politics of signification’. This signifying work develops interpretative schema 
that enable actors ‘to locate, perceive, identify and label’ social processes (Goffman, 1974, p. 
21). Social groups play a central role in generating or challenging interpretative schemes 
through their mobilising speech. Effective identity-work constructed in frames has been 
found to fulfill three tasks – formulating a grievance and a collective identity; developing 
shared goals and specific strategies for the attainment of goals; and motivating collective 
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action (Cress & Snow, 2000; Snow & Benford, 1988; Snow et al., 1986). This process thus 
includes the development of different types of ideas: Firstly, a new policy paradigm, also 
dubbed ‘foreground ideas’ with specifies goals to be achieved. A policy paradigm privileges 
certain actions over others shaping actors’ self-understanding of their own interest and goals 
and providing ways to sway public opinion. Secondly, ‘causal beliefs’ (Goldstein & 
Keohane, 1993, p. 10) about cause-effect relationships, define grievances and specific 
strategies for how such a policy paradigm can be achieved. Both of these types of ideas are 
grounded in normative ‘principled beliefs’, which help ‘actors judge how the world ought to 
be and provide them with a moral compass’ (Hauptmeier & Heery, 2014, p. 2475). Principled 
beliefs strongly motivate collective action. In addition to these types of ideas, effective 
framing involves uniting actors around collective identities, i.e. self-ascribed characteristics, 
vis-à-vis other actors.  
Islamic EOs have developed such principled and causal beliefs in their publicity and 
activities. As a result, EO members have developed significant commonalities in their 
understanding and interpretation of the situation, a shared goal of gaining a seat at the 
bargaining table, a contentious identity vis-à-vis secular elites, and a normative attachment to 
new tactics, all embedded in a wider shared value system. A shared value system does not 
only gather members around shared models for action (Hall & Taylor, 1996), providing 
solidarity and trust by organising experiences (Turner, 1983), but it provides new ideas as 
weapons to influence public opinion (Hauptmeier & Heery, 2014).  
It also enhances legitimacy, which has been shown to be an important mechanism 
resulting from effective identity-work (Cress & Snow, 2000, p. 1100). Increased legitimacy 
promotes mobilisation by securing sympathetic allies and official political support. The role 
of professional organisations (Farndale & Brewster, 2005), and CSOs (Williams, Abbott, & 
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Heery, 2011) in legitimacy-creation has been acknowledged in multiple ER studies and is 
also crucial for private EOs to influence public policy (Schmitter & Streeck, 1999).  
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Employers’ organisations in Turkey  
 
EOs in Turkey are divided along politico-ideological lines  (Buğra, 1998), with separate 
organizations existing for secular and Islamic employers. A further distinction can be drawn 
between ‘mixed’ EOs, that represent both labour market and product market interests of 
member employers, and traditional employers’ associations that focus on collective industrial 
relations. The main organization in Turkey that deals with the latter is TISK (Turkish 
Employers’ Confederation), an umbrella confederation of sectoral EOs. Employers can join 
both the TISK affiliates and the mixed EOs. The focus of the research presented below is on 
the latter, because these EOs represent a larger number of employers and employees and have 
been more successful  in shaping the public policy and political agenda (Yeşilbağ, 2015). 
Until the 1970s, employers’ organisation had been limited to compulsory membership 
of state-controlled Chambers of Industry and Commerce. The first EO – Tüsiad (Turkey 
Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association), was established in 1971 as the owners of 
large holding companies grew more independent of the state. Tüsiad represents the large and 
secular employers, which were nurtured by the Kemalist elites in the Istanbul-Marmara 
region (Pamuk, 2012). Its membership comprises a small, albeit economically powerful 
section of employers; about 600 members representing 2,500 firms in 2011. Further 
information on the EO–case studies can be found in Table 1 below. 
While the state promoted top-down industrialisation investing into large firms, SMEs, 
especially in remote and underdeveloped central-and southeast Anatolia had little access to 
investment funds and other privileges. Instead, Anatolian employers took advantage of the 
step-wise economic liberalisation of the 1980s, and had initially relied on informal grassroots 
networks and a pattern of pooling private resources. The Islamic movement successfully 
mobilised these SMEs, and they became the backbone of the Islamic movement. Its various 
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factions organised in the powerful EO Müsiad (with close ties to the AKP), and later in the 
confederation Tuskon, which had close ties to the Gülen movement until its closure in 2016.  
The Gülen movement, which is centred around the preacher Fethullah Gülen, 
embodies a socio-economic and moderate branch of Islam. An international, informal 
network of education and business networks in media, health and trade provided its financial 
resources (Agai, 2004). Tuskon was the movement’s business arm; founded in 2005 by 
gathering existing local associations under one roof. By 2012 it represented 33,260 
employers.  There has been an ‘extensive purge of all Gülen linked groups since 17 
December 2013’ (Özcan & Gündüz, 2015, p. 23). The Gülen community was declared a 
terrorist organisation in Turkey in October 2015, and individuals, organisations, and 
corporations suspected of being affiliated to the movement have been imprisoned, purged and 
closed down since the attempted coup of July 16th 2016. 
The combined industrial output of Islamic EOs remains smaller than that of the 
secular Tüsiad. Tüsiad contributed 65% of industrial production, whereas Müsiad contributed 
15% of Turkey's GDP in 2012. The majority of Müsiad firms were micro-firms in the 1990s, 
yet Islamic capital has shown significant growth benefitting from the growing power of the 
AKP (Özcan & Gündüz, 2015, p. 22). Additionally, Islamic EOs represented a wider variety 
of employers and employed a larger number of employees (Eligür, 2010, p. 203). 
Membership3 and branch growth figures illustrate the immense mobilising potential of 
Islamic EOs. Müsiad’s membership began with only 136 employers in 1991. In the 2011–
2012 period, Müsiad had 4,900 members, representing more than 15,000 companies. 
Compared to the secular Tüsiad’s two branches across Turkey, Müsiad features 
representational offices in 31 of Turkey’s provinces (2012 data). In contrast, the secular 
Tüsiad has no branches outside of Istanbul and Ankara. Locally, the membership of the 
secular EO in Gaziantep doubled between 1993 and 2012, but remained below the overall 
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rate of firm growth. In contrast, one additional Islamic EO joined Tuskon and the second 
Tuskon-affiliate almost quintupled its membership.  
Methods and Design 
 
Turkey has been chosen for this study as it represents a ‘deviant’ (Lijphart, 1971) case that is 
poorly explained by existing EO theories, and that provides a successful example of identity-
based employer mobilisation through social movement tactics. Findings are based on 51 
semi-structured interviews in Gaziantep’s textile cluster conducted between 2010 and 2012 
covering the time from 1993, when the first Islamic EOs were formed in Gaziantep, to 2012. 
Additional documents that were used in the research include the brochures and homepages of 
EOs and local companies, as well as articles in newspapers and magazines. Interviewees 
included employers and representatives of both EOs and public institutions, alongside further 
external experts from research institutions. All materials were analysed via a hybrid approach 
to thematic analysis (Attride-Stirling, 2001). The hybrid approach allows for themes to be 
created both inductively, generalising from codes to more global themes, and deductively 
from theoretical concepts of EOs and social movements (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).  
Gaziantep is one of the most successful new industrial growth centres in Turkey, 
where the dominant secular EO and political parties have lost the competition for political 
power with more influential Islamic EOs and parties. At the time of the study, Gaziantep had 
three Islamic EOs and one secular EO. In addition to a local Müsiad branch, there were two 
affiliates or members of the confederation Tuskon: Gapgiad (‘Gaziantep Sharing Young 
Businessmen’s Association’), and Hürsiad (‘Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s 
Association’). Another, Gagiad (‘Gaziantep Young Businessmen’s Association’), represents 
the elitist, secular businesspeople of the region. According to the association’s information, 
Gagiad’s members represented ca. 75% of Gaziantep’s economy. In many respects, this 
organisation is similar to Tüsiad. The two local members of the secular EO Tüsiad were 
Page 12 of 35Human Resource Management Journal
 13
interviewed as well. None of the organisations provide detailed information on their 
membership, and no external databases on membership are available. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Interviewees were selected from the textile-manufacturing cluster in Gaziantep. EOs 
in Turkey aim to organise powerful industrial companies, and therefore non-industrial 
companies were excluded. Gaziantep’s textile cluster is among the internationally most 
competitive and is the largest in Turkey (Kunt & Zobu, 2011). It includes the textiles, 
clothing, apparel, leather, footwear, and complementary plastics industries (Öz, 2004). 
Although there are differences between industries, the membership mobilisation of Islamic 
EOs took place across all of these industries. Limiting the sample to organisations with the 
same types of production requirements and services enhances comparability and reduces 
extraneous sources of variation and measurement error (Becker & Gerhart, 1996, p. 792). 
Interviewees were chosen to represent a large variety of politico-religious views and 
affiliations among owner-managers, leaders and representatives from all EOs and relevant 
public institutions (see Table A1 in Appendix). They were placed into the following 
categories on the basis of the evidence gathered: Islamic leaders and Islamic businessmen; 
strategic political entrepreneurs who joined pro-business political parties in addition to EOs 
at opportune times; strategic businessmen, who joined different EOs depending on the 
incumbent government; and secular businessmen who had never joined any Islamic groups. 
Industry and coalition leaders were identified with the help of local experts from the 
Chambers and the EOs. Representatives from public institutions, relevant academics, and 
‘outsiders’ were added to the sample for triangulation. Further snowball sampling was 
employed until saturation (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) of the material was reached. EOs did not 
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provide information on the company sizes of their membership, but compared to the overall 
textile industry in Gaziantep, the sample is skewed toward larger industrial firms, some of 
which are among the top 1000 in Turkey. EO leaders stressed that it is exactly these larger 
firms they aim to mobilise. All interviews were conducted based on anonymity, in the 
Turkish language, and subsequently transcribed verbatim.  
Findings  
 
1a) Identity-Work: New foreground ideas and principled beliefs  
 
Müsiad’s publication ‘Homo Islamicus’ (Homo Islamicus, 1994), is a key publication of 
Islamic EOs, which continues to shape their actions and beliefs. The ‘Homo Islamicus’ 
contained a principled beliefs system and foreground ideas developing a rational and 
capitalist Islamic value system. Müsiad leadership asserted: ‘The capitalist system (…) 
adversely affects the world economy and people. It needs to change. Our culture and religion 
(…) can change it.’ (Şahin, 2009). To this end, Islamic EOs aimed to develop ‘laws with 
divine origins’ rooted in Islam for Muslim countries and companies. Islamic capitalism was 
to be based on cooperation, community, and morality rather than competition and rationality. 
Philanthropy as well as voluntary and patriarchal labour relations were favoured over 
regulated tax, welfare and industrial relations systems. The state was limited to providing 
infrastructure for a free market economy, while a system of voluntary ‘zekat’ (alms) was to 
care for the poor. Instead of focusing on self-interested profit-maximisation, Muslims were 
told to maximise ‘felâh’– salvation and happiness in the present and afterlife. Therefore, 
paying alms, for example, was not be regarded as interrupting economic efficiency, but as 
investment into the afterlife. On the basis of this value system, more specific causal beliefs 
around means-ends relationships and strategies as well as collective identities were 
developed, which will be discussed in the next section. 
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1b) Identity-work: Collective identity, causal beliefs (grievances, goals, and 
strategies), and legitimacy 
 
Müsiad leadership described their Islamic EO as a ‘pressure group’ rather than a service 
organisation. Most interviewees regarded Islamic EOs’ collective action as political and 
contentious, challenging state authority. The key grievance voiced by Anatolian 
businesspeople was the active exclusion of Anatolian SMEs by secular elites from 
negotiating tables and economic resources for ideological reasons. The Constitution 
following the military coup of 1980 restricted associational activity and Islamic groups: it had 
crushed the left and labour movement, and made formal ties between political and Islamic 
organisations illegal. Several Müsiad leaders were briefly imprisoned in 1997 alongside the 
current President Erdogan for using Islam in their speeches and attacking the state. This 
feeling of grievance was echoed in many employers’ statements, and resonated with and 
united them around deeply felt exclusion and anger against a ‘secular elite’. The head of 
Gaziantep’s most influential company stressed this exclusion and differentiation in a 
newspaper interview:  
In the past, Tüsiad appeared to be appropriate for Istanbul capital only. (…) Anatolian 
businessmen didn’t use to become members because they were small- and medium-sized. (…) 
Now they keep inviting us, but we don’t want to join anymore. (…). Membership is not a 
matter of persuasion; it’s a matter of principle. (Kadak, 2010).  
 
This grievance extended to a feeling amongst the broader Islamic population that they 
were excluded in Turkish society, politics and public life more widely. Erol Yarar, one of 
Müsiad’s prominent founders, similarly argued that an ‘elitist’ Tüsiad discriminated against 
‘hardworking, pious’ Islamic employers (Şahin, 2009). He used the terms ‘Black vs. White 
Turk’. This juxtaposed Anatolian or ‘Black Turks’, depicting them as Islamic, dark-skinned 
with Arab origins, with ‘White Turks’, depicting the urban and Western-oriented Republican 
elite as a group with a fair skin-tone. This statement amplified a sharp distinction between 
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institutions regarded as Kemalist and urban-elitist, and a pious group of supposedly rural 
‘underdogs’ as opposing collective identities.  Moreover, Müsiad strongly stressed Islam in 
its identity, as illustrated by statements from its leadership:  
Müsiad is an ideological association. (…) It’s not an association that was just founded to make 
money. We have a mission and a vision. (…) Our key strategy is to promote an Islamic 
identity and to translate that into business life. This principle is expressed in our motto: High 
morality, high technology. (…) We need to internalise moral values to produce high 
technology. (interview 8) 
 
Employers regarded EOs as representing different political factions. In Islamic EOs, 
employers came together based on religiosity and a shared worldview: 
All of these employers’ organisations’ (…) understandings are quite different: Müsiad, for 
example, is religious, it accepts moral people as members. Müsiad members won’t drink 
alcohol, so they have a different world view from [the secular] Gagiad. It’s people with 
similar views who will want to get together. (interview 23) 
 
The collective goal of Islamic EOs, here exemplified in Müsiad’s vision, was aimed at 
increasing the social mobility, political representation and influence of pious Anatolian elites: 
Müsiad gathered Anatolian SMEs under its roof and opened them to the world. We developed 
a bourgeois class. My father was among the founders of Tüsiad (…). I saw in my family that 
we could unite religion and worldly affairs. But in society these two sides were strangers to 
each other. So much that when we organised Müsiad’s first congress in a five-star hotel, our 
friends said ‘what business do we have here?!’ They had forgotten that they were the 
foundation, they had accepted their marginalisation, and they felt like they had become 
Turkey’s Blacks. (…) They had control mechanisms that are like those used in a zoo. In 
Turkey, religion has always been kept under control. (Şahin, 2009) 
 
The Müsiad leadership asserts that ‘Müsiad was founded with the belief that such an idea [of 
the Homo Islamicus] can only grow through institutional structures’ (Şahin, 2009). 
Nevertheless, Islamic employers remained cautious about directly and clearly stating their 
goal as transforming Turkey’s secular institutions. Major strategies developed were, firstly, 
to organise pious Anatolian SMEs and to promote their cooperation, as well as their access to 
the structures and positions of positions of political power to foster a new economic elite and 
achieve legitimate political representation. Secondly, Islamic employers were encouraged to 
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follow the practices discussed below that stretched from their roles within business and as 
employers to the civic sphere to support ‘the just cause’. 
Contributions to public and selective goods were presented as a religious and national 
duty, as essential for eternal peace and worldly economic success alike. Islamic principled 
beliefs supported and legitimised their money-making. Islam provided an explanation of why 
hard work and entrepreneurship were important qualities. Pious behaviours in the private and 
civic realms, e.g. religious fasting or charitable work, were regarded as a prerequisite for 
economic success. A pious employer stated: 
If a person lives according to the right principles, then he’ll find peace. Everything is 
connected. (…) Religion is the language of love, of beauty, if you have it, then you are 
beautiful, if you don’t have it, there’s nothing. (…) (interview 23)  
We do this to fulfil God’s will. Everything turns out well for a good person; you will also do 
your work well. (…) These activities are not against the state, we want the state to take 
possession of them. Our ‘hoca efendi’ [referring to cleric Fethullah Gülen] wants it this way 
(…). Apart from education, we provide social help to the poor. We go to poor neighbourhoods 
and distribute food every day to almost 1000 people, to the needy, the ill (…). (interview 22) 
 
Thereby, they situated ‘themselves among the faithful, devoted to just causes and beyond the 
realm of economic interests’ (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2011). Islamic EOs did indeed take on 
quasi-public functions by administrating education and welfare programs through public 
funds. Islamic employers paid alms (donating 1/40th of company’s profit), contributed to the 
Gülen community’s educational efforts, and took part several times a week in religious 
meetings. Both EOs and their member-employers gained major legitimacy by promoting 
themselves as providers of public goods by sponsoring highly visible institutions and naming 
schools, hospitals, and mosques after themselves. 
 
2) Trust and solidarity  
 
EOs facilitated cooperation simply by providing a platform for like-minded employers to 
meet, which was crucial for then marginalised Islamic actors. EOs and the religious 
community functioned as important bridges between employers, creating trust and closeness 
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based on similarity and repeated transactions. A secular employer explained how pious 
employers had gradually transformed the sense of community generated in multifunctional 
religious community ties into trade ties and economic cooperation. For example, at two 
Islamic EOs, members established cooperative, multi-ownership companies, and they offered 
fellow-members preferential rates for their products. 
EOs applied stringent membership selection procedures, investigating companies’ 
business and employer credentials to facilitate inter-firm trust. Potential members were 
required to exhibit a set of behaviours and norms that matched the Islamic movement’s views 
of a pious (Sunni) Islamic capitalist. In Islamic EOs, beyond business credentials, additional 
checks were made into ideological orientation: the membership forms of Tuskon-affiliates 
included questions on political orientations, and which charities and religious leaders were 
being followed and supported. Islamic EOs also investigated ‘individuals’ strength of faith’ 
(interview 21), and the conduct of employers’ and their families’ private lives. Consequently, 
the pool of employers given access to resources was limited to those supporting this branch 
of the Islamic movement. A shared value system based on Islam created solidarity and 
incentives for exchanging selective goods and resources, which are analysed in more detail 
below.  
 
3) Material goods: Selective Goods 
 
EO membership provided a range of important material selective goods and services for 
members. Firstly, Islamic EOs liaised with financial institutions, getting preferential deals 
from public banks or the Gülen community’s Bank Asya. Bank Asya had grown to be among 
Turkey’s largest banks with the support of AKP elites (Rodeheffer, 2013) before its recent 
purge and bankruptcy. Hürsiad additionally offered certain legal services for free. This 
provision allegedly saved some large Gaziantep firms from bankruptcy. Members could 
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acquire loans more easily and faster if key elites vouched for their creditworthiness. Through 
such ties, loan conditions were improved, too, providing lower interest rates, or longer 
repayment periods.  
Secondly, preferential information served as another key selective good. Such 
preferential information was exchanged during religious meetings, EO or other club dinners 
among political, business, and civic leaders. Participation in these activities resulted in 
preferential treatment of movement-affiliates through political party ties as members profited 
from tailor-made and faster information and bureaucratic processing. Access to key 
gatekeepers and information provided advantages in dealings with public organisations and 
involving politicians, e.g. in lobbying, winning public tenders and funding, or in gaining 
export licences. 
Thirdly, Islamic EO’s trade promotion was one of their key draws for members to 
join. The Islamic confederation, Tuskon’s international network of branches extended all 
over the world. It had five official international branches, but the large network of Gülen 
schools also served as informal contact points. Both provided basic services, information on 
markets, and organised business meetings. These contact points directly benefited trade since 
the community bought ‘goods for its big network of followers, who ran firms, hospitals, 
media outlets, newspapers, TV and radio stations, and supermarket chains’ (interview 34). 
For example, Kaynak Holding, a company formed to supply Gülen schools, became 
Turkey’s largest supplier of educational materials at the time of the study (Rodeheffer, 2013).  
Islamic EOs also invested heavily into popular trade fairs exclusive to their members, 
which provided important opportunities to meet potential international collaborators, 
subcontractors or customers, and to catch-up on current trends. A turnover of 25 billion US 
dollars had been generated at Tuskon’s trade fairs between 2006 and 2011, and dozens of 
Gaziantep firms regularly participated. The Islamic EO, Müsiad, mainly promoted trade by 
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connecting provincial employers with political elites through high-profile international trips. 
Islamic EOs also created sophisticated e-services to promote trade and cooperation among 
members nationally and internationally, and especially Tuskon’s version generated serious 
profits for members. Finding customers and business partners who are trustworthy, and 
acquiring information about international marketplaces, were important selective goods for 
employers.  
Finally, beyond such benign trade promotion, patronage networks that go beyond 
information- and service- provision were common. The resources of local administrations 
and the privatisation of public services had been stepped up since the AKP’s rise, increasing 
the availability of local public rents (Özcan, 2006). New, more flexible public institutions 
operating at the local level, e.g. the infamous TOKI (Housing Development Administration), 
were founded or altered seemingly to support patronage exchanges. Many large employers 
acquired favourable business deals facilitated through their religious ties. These extended to 
building plots, privatisation deals, infrastructure projects secured through the TOKI, public 
tenders, or favourable legislation (Rodeheffer, 2013).  
 
4) Employment practices  
Islamic EOs promoted specific types of employment policies and actions. The secular EO 
Tüsiad has increasingly forged relationships with trade unions (Akan, 2011). In comparison, 
Islamic EOs were strongly anti-union and hostile toward formal labour relations (Duran & 
Yildirim, 2005). Erol Yarar of Müsiad was prominently quoted telling a representative of the 
Islamic trade union, Hak-Iş, that the Prophet asserted that ‘a good worker is one who obeys 
employers’ (Duran & Yildirim 2005, p. 238 ff.).  Müsiad’s ‘Homo Islamicus’ argued for 
cooperative, paternalistic and informal employee relations replacing and suppressing trade 
unions. This is perhaps surprising, given that one might expect a social partnership between 
Islamic EOs and Hak-Iş, the labour wing of the same political Islamist movement from which 
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Müsiad and the AKP had emerged. However, the Islamic movement has excluded labour 
interests (Duran & Yildirim, 2005). Instead, shared religious feelings have been exploited to 
prevent unionisation. Even where Hak-Iş successfully organised, relations remain hostile 
with violent anti-unionisation strategies and examples of workers going on hunger strikes 
(e.g. at Yimpaş, a large Islamic food company). An affiliate of Hak-Iş in textiles went on a 
132 day-long strike at one of Erol Yarar’s companies. Locally, employers did not regard 
unions as influential and perceived unionisation in Gaziantep and the Anatolian region to be 
very low. The local leader of an Islamic EO, for example, explained he opened a new, non-
unionised plant to which he would move his operations in order to avoid the textile union 
already organised in one of his other plants.  
This paternalism and the hostility of Islamic EOs to unions translated into workplace 
relations were cooperation, harmony and lifelong loyalty were expected from workers. 
Workers were constructed as family members with the owner-manager as head of the family. 
The influence of Islamic values was evident in workplace practices. For example, morale 
among employees and business contacts was to be increased by organising pilgrimage tours 
and Islamic employers were expected to provide prayer rooms for employees, and to organise 
work around prayer and fasting times. A major international carpet producer and strategic 
employer in the region got a bad reputation for allegedly not allowing its employees to fulfil 
their religious duty of prayer five times a day. Consequently, a prayer room was provided, 
and the Friday prayer become advertised on the company’s homepage.  
Islamic EOs fulfilled important HR functions at the workplace level in training and 
recruitment. In contrast, the local secular EO had no such explicit policies or actions. For 
example, Gapgiad used state funds to run courses to train administrative personnel, graphic 
designers, or to improve computer skills, all of which were very popular amongst member 
employers. Hürsiad even had a private classroom in its branch offices. Several businessmen 
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confirmed that they took part in EO training courses and found these indispensable. Islamic 
EO members also used Gülen school networks to find talented graduates to develop a 
compliant, devout workforce. In the words of one employer, recruiting from within the 
Islamic network helped ‘to create a different kind of team spirit (…) they become a group’ 




This article has performed three tasks. It has analysed the identity-work of Islamic EOs, 
identified the resources these EOs create to advance the interests of their members and 
examined the consequences of Islamic identity for the conduct of employment relations. To 
sum up, Islamic EOs developed a system of principled beliefs and a policy paradigm 
grounded in a rational, capitalist, socio-economic type of Islam (Yavuz, 2003). On the basis 
of this value system, Islamic EOs developed identity-, and market-based strategies to garner 
political influence and legitimacy. These strategies encompassed organising and creating trust 
by forming EOs and cooperating with religious civil society; developing selective resources 
and political networks to form a rival Islamic business elite; and contributing to public goods 
to increase legitimacy. Islamic EOs and employers engaged in harsh anti-union and 
paternalistic employment and management practices that emphasised Islamic values. Islamic 
EOs generated selective material goods, engaged in lobbying, patronage networks, and even 
rent-seeking to mobilise members and resources. These rational material activities were 
framed as religious and national duty. This framing, together with Islamic EOs’ civic 
activities enhanced their legitimacy. 
Other recent studies of EOs which focus on the tactics that lead to successful 
mobilisation stress the part played by activities and resources that appeal to employers’ 
rational material and lobbying interests (Behrens & Traxler, 2004; Hornung-Draus, 2002; 
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Sheldon et al., 2016). The present study develops an alternative and neglected mobilisation 
process among employers – identity-work. It has been shown that the activities of Islamic 
EOs’ fulfilled employers’ rational interests by providing strong selective incentives, but also 
served a wider, collective and public goal: improving the political representation, influence, 
and legitimacy of a previously marginalised group. The attainment of this goal, moreover, 
was shown to depend on identity-work that both generated a collective Islamic identity 
amongst employers and supported the provision of selective goods. Rational, material 
interests were important, but subordinated to larger contentious public goal of challenging 
authority and to promote Islamic values and institutions. Therefore, EOs’ resource-generation 
and identity-work qualify as movement tactics, rather than solely as economic services to 
members or political services for rational politicians. 
Identity-work and purely symbolic challenges to authority are traditionally not 
conceptualised as contentious social movement tactics; neither are established organisational 
tactics such as lobbying or providing selective incentives. To be categorised as social 
movement, mobilisation needs to include examples of explicitly contentious strategies, in 
addition to their taking place outside of organised institutional channels with the aim of 
providing a contentious public good. This article develops a novel argument: EOs, even if 
they do not mobilise explicitly contentious protest can still be analysed as social movements 
as long as definitions of the latter are not limited to direct means of contention, but include 
‘quiet’ forms of protest. Identity-work and resource-generation, although not directly violent 
or disruptive, can indirectly challenge and disrupt authority in a two-stage process. slamic 
EOs first had to change accepted values and religious practices and create a new, legitimate 
business elite by providing selective goods rather than attacking state institutions directly. 
Only after introducing new ideas into public debate, normalising Islamic values and norms, 
while at the same time mobilising resource-rich and cohesive members united around shared 
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and legitimate ideas, could identity-work lead to wider contentious institutional change. By 
mobilising members, resources, and changing cultural practices and values through identity-
work, Islamic EOs indirectly challenged the Turkish state. The newly legitimised normative 
institutions partly supplanted the existing Kemalist institutional framework in employment 
and business practices, but also in education and welfare more widely (Buğra & Savaşkan, 
2014). 
This article contributes to literature by applying social movement theory to EOs, an 
exercise that has not been performed previously. The presented social movement model 
combines political, material, and ideological variables in explaining the mobilisation power 
of EOs. Such an approach can better capture our understanding of the wide range of 
processes and structures (Schneiberg & Lounsbury, 2008) that EOs apply.  
Arguably, indirect contention is particularly relevant for EOs, which unlike other 
movements of workers or other subordinate groups have greater structural power. Politicians 
and political parties have a rational interest in collaborating with employers who provide jobs 
for the electorate and can make large contributions to the public purse. Employers have easier 
access to political elites, in addition to their greater material resources, both of which make 
the explicitly disruptive tactics of traditional social movements redundant.  
Identity-work is especially important when the legitimacy enshrined in institutional 
arrangements breaks down or does not exist in the first place. As shared policy goals and 
channels vis-à-vis employees break down as push factors for employer collective action, EOs 
have to develop alternative mobilisation strategies to continue their influence. While material 
selective incentives have been widely studied, this study has shown that identity-work can be 
a powerful tool for mobilising new members and alternative resources, not just for traditional 
social movements, but for employers, too. The approach adopted here is relevant to multiple 
countries where EOs with movement characteristics have emerged. Future research could 
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compare country-cases and tease out which conditions are necessary for them to emerge in 
the first place, and to be as successful in the long run as in Turkey. 
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1 Hürsiad representative n/a Islamic Leadership 




3 Gapgiad representative n/a Islamic Leadership 




5 Gagiad representative 
  
n/a Secular Leadership 
6 Gagiad leadership  Not textile Secular Leadership 
7 Müsiad Gaziantep leadership  Not textile Islamic Leadership 
8 Müsiad co-founder  Not textile Islamic Leadership 
9 Müsiad HQ representative  n/a Islamic Leadership 
10 Municipality employee n/a Public Institution 
11 City Council representative 
Owner-manager  
1 Strategic Political Entrepreneur  
12 Kosgeb representative n/a Public Institution 
13 Development Agency representative  n/a Public Institution 
14–16 Local academics n/a  Public Institution 
17 Local teacher  n/a Public Institution  
18 Owner-manager  3 Islamic Employer 
19 Owner-manager  3 Islamic Employer 




Owner-managers 2 and 3  
2 Islamic Employer 
23 Owner-manager 
 
2 Islamic Employer 
24 Owner-manager 4 Strategic Political Entrepreneur 
25 Owner-manager  3 Strategic Political Entrepreneur  
26 Owner-manager 3 Strategic Employer 
27 Top-level manager 3 Strategic Employer 
28 Top-level manager 2 Strategic Employer 
29 Owner-manager 3 Strategic Employer 
30 Owner-manager 2 Strategic Employer 
31 Owner-manager 4 Strategic Employer 
32 Owner-manager 2 Secular Employer 
33 Owner-manager 2 Secular Employer 
34 Owner-manager;  
Co-founder secular EO 
1 Secular Employer 
35 Top-level manager  Not textile Secular Employer 
36 Owner-manager  Not textile Secular Employer 
* Based on number of employees; Sources: Gaziantep Chamber of Industry, interviews and company 
homepages; Small firms (1): <49 employees; Medium firms (2): 50–249 employees; Large firms (3): 
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Endnotes 
                                                
i Turkey’s early state ideology is Kemalism. In Kemalist secularism, the state actively controls 
religion and confines it to the private sphere (Kuru (2006, p. 137). I refer to such actors and 
institutions as secular that signal their support for Kemalist secularism, whereas I refer to such actors 
as Islamic that signal their support for the restructuring Kemalist secularism and/or seeking greater 
Islamisation in the public, social and cultural spheres. 
 
ii Institutions are broadly defined to include not only ‘hard’ institutions, i.e. formal rules and 
procedures, but also the norms, ‘symbol systems, cognitive scripts and moral templates that provide 
frames of meaning guiding human action’. (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 947)  
 
3 The membership unit is the employer-businessperson (owner-mangers, managers, and in Müsiad, as 
well as some Tuskon-affiliates, professionals) rather than the firm. Multiple employer-
businesspersons from one firm can become members, and each member may have multiple firms. 
Therefore, the number of firms is far larger than the number of members. 
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